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GOVERNMENTAL TECHNIQUES FOR THE CONSERVATION
AND UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES: AN ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSAL
"THE physical problem of controlling the flow of a river involves the entire
drainage basin. Our greatest and most unruly river drains thirty-one states
and over forty per cent of the country." 1 Effective regulation and develop-
ment of a basin area which does not lie within the confines of a single state
presupioses the integration of appropriate governmental powers and the
implementation of comprehensive regional water and land programs.2 Na-
1. Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation and Utilization of Water
Resources (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 274, 283.
2. For a lucid and detailed exposition of the necessity for regional planning and de-
velopment as applied to the particular problems of New England, see THE DIRECTIVE COM-
MITTEE ON REGIONAL PLANNING (YALE UNIVERSITY), THE CASE FOR REGIONAL PLANNING
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NEW ENGLAND (1946). Myres S. McDougal and Maurice H.
Rotival are co-chairmen of the Committee which includes Everett V. Meeks, Ashbel G.
Gulliver, Roscoe Suttie, Charles Walker, and George Dudley. This study forms the back-
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tional Departments, Independent Commissions, and a Regional Valley
Authority have been utilized to execute a national water policy, but their
operations have been impeded by jurisdictional strife and by the absence of
adequate powers. Since paramount responsibility for major resource develop-
ment rests with the federal government, the programs effectuated through
interstate commissions and compacts are necessarily limited in scope. The
Courts have endeavored to resolve individual interstate disputes but have
been unable to supply the specialized, technical treatment and the continu-
ous supervision demanded by drainage basin problems.
A rough functional outline and legal rationale is therefore offered in sup-
port of a new executive agency to be vested with complete federal and state
authority bearing upon the conservation and utilization of water resources.
The suggested program envisages the creation of a federal corporation, the
formulation of a joint Federal-State regional policy, and the delegation to
the corporation by interstate compact of important functions presently
exercised by the state governments.
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERSTATE DISPUTES
The Supreme Court has become a frequent arbiter of interstate water dis-
putes by virtue of a constitutional grant of original jurisdiction and an
assertion that interstate water apportionment presents a federal question.3
In the face of two sharply divergent systems of sectional water law,4 the
Court, notwithstanding Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, has moved hesitantly
towards the enunciation of a single common law of interstate waters,5 and
has decreed physical allocations among contestants in conformity with this
formula.'
ground for much of the analysis presented in this comment. For other attempts to define a
"region" geographically see NAT. RESOURCES Comm., REGIONAL FACToRS I-, NATIO.-A,
PLANING AND DEVELOPmENT (1935) 145-9, hereafter cited as REGIONAL FACTORS. The
theory of regionalism is sharply distinguished from political and economic "sectionalism"
in ODuss, THE REGIONAL APPROACH To NATIONAL SOCIAL PLANNING (1935) 19. The prob-
lem of regionalism as applied to water resources is discussed in HODGe, THE TE,.NEsEE
VALLEY AUTHORITY (1938) 1-23.
3. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2; Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92, 109 (1938); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,464(1922).
4. For comprehensive treatment of the doctrines of riparian rights and prior appro-
priation, see HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAw OF WATER RIGHTS IN TIE WEST,
U. S. DEP'T OF AGasc., MIsc. PUB. No. 418 (1942) 30-109; NAT. REsouRcEs PL,=NnG
BD., WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE REP., STATE WATER LAW IN TE DEVELOrEENT OF
THE WEST (1943) 5-38.
5. On the very day that the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompklins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
was announced, Justice Brandeis declared: "Whether the water of an interstate stream must
be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110 (1938). See also Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907).
6. In early cases, the Supreme Court refused to concede absolute appropriation rights
1947]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
However, the substantive doctrines formulated by the Court have not
proved adequate even for the limited purposes of defining individual rights
or forestalling subsequent litigation. Thus, a controversy over diversions
from Lake Michigan necessitated six suits involving the same parties, and a
dispute between Wyoming and Colorado evoked five Supreme Court opin-
ions.7 The reluctance of the Court to grant injunctive relief may result in
the completion of the allegedly harmful appropriation long before judgment
has been rendered.8 Moreover, the reconciliation of conflicting water uses
with the demands of a comprehensive national policy is a complex adminis-
trative function defying efficient exercise by an agency which lacks technical
engineering skillsY The Court has recognized the need for specialized treat-
ment of water problems by the appointment of qualified masters to conduct
preliminary investigations, but it has reserved the right to reject or modify
the master's report and to substitute its own theories of allocation."0 It has
attempted to furnish continuity of administration by providing for subse-
quent modification of its original decree," but it thereby invites further time-
consuming and expensive litigation. 12 The Court appears to be aware of its
to upper basin states or total natural flow rights to lower basin jurisdictions. Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). In suits between
two riparian states, the Court ordered an "equitable apportionment" rather than a division
in conformity with the common law doctrine; and this same principle was applied to dis-
putes in which the states had conflicting systems of water law. Connecticut v. Massachu-
setts, 282 U. S. 660 (1931); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342 (1931); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). Where both states had adopted the prior appropriation sys-
tem, the Court originally attempted to allocate water on the basis of strict priority but it
now in effect applies the "equitable apportionment" formula to this situation. Compare
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (1922), with Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618
(1945).
7. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U, S. 367 (1929); 281 U. S. 179 (1930); 289 U. S. 395
(1933); 309 U. S. 569 (1940); 311 U. S. 107 (1940); 313 U. S. 547 (1940). Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (1922); 260 U. S. 1 (1922); 286 U. S. 494 (1932); 298 U. S. 573
(1936); 309 U. S. 572 (1940); see Donovan, State Compacts as a Method of Settling Problems
Common to Several States (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 5, 8; INTERSTATE COMI. ON TuE
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN ANNUAL REPORT (1945) 21.
8. The threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and clearly proved
before the Court will act, and the burden of proof on a plaintiff state is much heavier than
that placed upon a private litigant. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374 (1923);
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 309 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 521
(1906). In fact, up to 1944, the Court had granted injunctive relief in only three interstate
water disputes. See Note (1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 437, 439 n. 12, 441; NAT. RESOURCES 13t,
REP. (1934) 379.
9. See McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention (1941) 50
YALE L. J. 827, 837; REGIONAL FACTORS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52; NAT. RESOURCES 1BD.
REP. (1934) 379.
10. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U. S. 383 (1943)."
11. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 655 (1945). In his dissenting opinion Justice
Roberts protested that, by the decision, "three states, with respect to their quasi-sovereign
rights, will be in tutelage to this court henceforth." Id. at 663.
12. See Carpenter, Interstate River Compacts and Their Place in Water Utilization (1928)
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limitations and has on several occasions suggested the application of more
sophisticated administrative devices to the solution of interstate water
disputes.13
State and lower federal courts have dealt with water problems emerging
from interstate diversions by individual litigants. Contradictory results
have been reached with respect to the conveyance of appropriated water
across state lines14 and also as to the source of water rights in non-navigable
interstate streams.' 5 When the appropriation occurs in one state and the
use in a second, some courts have refused to render a judgment which in-
volves the determination of water rights having a foreign situs; others have
surmounted the jurisdictional problem.'
FEDERAL ADkINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR THE CONTROL OF
DRAINAGE BAsINs
The long history of the establishment of federal responsibility for water
resource development has been detailed elsewhere.17 National programs for
navigation improvement, flood control, irrigation and reclamation encourage-
ment, and power production have been rested by the courts upon the Com-
merce Clause, the War Power, the Treaty Power, and the general power
over national lands and property.' Judicial opinions have radically extended
the traditional definition of navigability, enlarged federal jurisdiction to
include both the tributaries and the non-navigable portions of navigable
streams, established the national government's right to sell electricity gen-
erated at its projects, and authorized the United States to construct trans-
20 J. Am. WATER WORKS Ass'n 756, 764-5; Ireland, Recent Dcrdopments in the Use of Inter-
state Water Compacts (1944) 21 DICTA 77,78-9.
13. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296, 313 (1921); Washington v. Oregon, 214 U. S. 205,218 (1909).
14. Compare Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 Pac. 210 (1903), With Walbridge v.
Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 125 Pac. 812 (1912). Statutory law is similarly divergent. See
HUTCMNS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 404-6.
15. See OLson, Tsm COLORADO RIVER COMPACT (1926) 112-20; Bannister, The Ques-
tion of Federal Dispositioh of State Waters in the Priority States (1915) 28 HARv. L. Rn.% 270.
16. Compare Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. TwiAn Falls Salmon River Land & Water
Co., 245 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917),;with Brooks v. United States, 119 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A.
9th, 1941) and State ex re. Sorensen v. Mitchell Irrigation District, 129 Neb. 586, 262 N. W.
543 (1935). In interstate disputes involving private litigants these courts have applied a
strict priority doctrine rather than "equitable apportionment." See Hoge v. Eaton, 135 Fed.
411 (C. C. D. Colo. 1905); Taylor v. Hulett, 15 Idaho 265,97 Pac. 37 (1908); Conant v. Deep
Creek& Curlew Valley Irrigation Co., 23 Utah 627, 66 Pac. 188 (1901).
17. See Fly, loc. cit. supra note 1; RANSMEIER, T:E TENNESSEE- VALLEY AUTHOaIT
(1942) 3-28.
18. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For a general dis-
cussion of the constitutional basis of federal powers over water resources, see CAAi., Ths
RIDDLE OF GOVERxENTAL POWER IN THE USE OF PUBLIC WATERS (1931) 6; OLso:,, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 139-52. The elements of a sound national water program are set forth in
NAT. RESOURCES COMMITTEE REP., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLEMS AND PROGrAmS (1937
Rev.) 7.
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mission lines to reach favorably situated markets. 19 In the Appalachian
Power case, moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the necessity for relating
all federal programs to navigation, perhaps implying the ultimate aban-
donment of the navigability test ;20 but subsequent lower court decisions
have not yet attempted to extend national authority to all interstate streams
regardless of navigability. 21
Departments, Bureaus, and Independent Commissions. The administration
of the national policy has been generally entrusted to the old-line depart-
ments and bureaus which had historically vested interests in particular
phases of the problem. Thus, a survey in 1938 indicated that six federal
departments-Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, State, War and Treasury-
and twenty-three subdivisions were embroiled in water control activities.22
In addition, nine independent agencies, four of which are presently defunct,
were vested with important related functions: the Emergency Conservation
Work, National Resources Committee, Public Works Administration, Work
Progress Administration, Farm Credit Administration, Federal Power Com-
mission Panama Canal Office, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the
Tennessee Valley Authority.23 As late as 1945, seven separate bureaus in
19. Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508 (1941); United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 409 (1940); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455-6 (1931);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913); United States v.
Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690 (1899). Compare United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499, 510 (1945).
20. "In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitutional power of the United
States over its waters is limited to control for navigation .... In truth the authority of the
United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters." United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 426 (1940). See OLSON, op. cit. supra note 15, at 148-9;
BAUM, TiE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY REGULATION (1942) 51;
NAT. RESOURCES BD. REP. (1934) 379.
21. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 147 F. (2d) 743
(C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F.
(2d) 155 (App. D. C. 1941). But cf. Missouri v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 42 F.
(2d) 692, 695 (C. D. Mo. 1930).
22. Dep't of Agriculture: Bureau of Agricultural Engineering, Bureau of Biological
Survey, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Bureau of Plant Industry, Forest
Service, Soil Conservation Service, and Weather Bureau. Dep't of Commerce: Bureau of the
Census, Bureau of Fisheries, National Hydraulic Laboratory, United States Coast and
Geodetic Survey. Dep't of the Interior: Bureau of Mines, Bureau of Reclamation, Grazing
Division, General Land Office, National Park Service, Office of Indian Affairs, United States
Geological Survey-Water Resources Branch, United States Geological Survey-Conserva-
tion Branch. Dep't of State: International Boundary Commission-United States and
Mexico, International Joint Commission-United States and Canada. War Dep't: Corps of
Engineers. Treasury Dep't: Public Health Service. See NAT. RESOURCES CoMMITTEE RuI'.
WATER PLANNING (1938) 8-9 and FEDERAL AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH WATER USE AND
CONTROL (1936). The 1938 survey did not include the U. S. Coast Guard which enforces
federal law upon the navigable waters.
23. Ibid. The 1938 survey omitted reference to the work of the Rural Electrification
Administration which is briefly described in the 1936 compilation.
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the Department of the Interior were simultaneously administering water
programs in the Missouri Valley.
24
Three major Departments are charged with the construction and opera-
tion of extensive systems of dams, reservoirs, canals and drains. Since 1902,
the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior has been as-
signed the functions of irrigation and reclamation, but its programs have
incidentally involved navigation, flood control, power production, recrea-
tional area development, municipal water supply studies, and fish and wild-
life propagation. 2 The Army Corps of Engineers is the chief federal agency
for the construction of flood control and navigation improvement projects,
while the Soil Conservation Bureau of the Department of Agriculture ad-
ministers national plans for erosion and drought alleviation. - Equally im-
portant is the Federal Power Commission which is vested with licensing
authority over dams constructed on all navigable waters and on non-
navigable streams subject to national control; the Commission also has the
power to regulate the interstate transmission and sale at wholesale of elec-
trical energy.2S
The most obvious characteristic of the existing organizational pattern is
the absence of nation-wide machinery for coordinated planning and for the
reconciliation of conflicting water uses as translated into departmental proj-
ects.Y It was not until 1945, for example, that an effort was made to corre-
24. The activities of each agency in the Valley are described in detail in Hearings Be-
fore Committee on Commerce on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 175-229; Hearings Before
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation on S. 555, 79th Cong., lstSess. (1945) 362-70.
25. The statutory basis of reclamation activities is set forth in DEP'T OF rT INTmioR,
RECLAMATION HANDBoon (1942) 19-28. For a description of the achievements of the
Bureau, see also NAT. RESOURCES Comiun E REP., DAINAGE BAswx PnoiLvs A-NuD
PROGRAMs (1937 Rev.) 83; INSTITUTE FOR GoVEN-ME.'r REsEAmCH, Tim UNITED STATES
RECLAMATION SERVIcE, Service Monographs of the United States Government No. 2 (1919);
DEP'T OF TrE INTERIOR, THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATxON; ITS FUNCTIONS AND AccoMsIS-
mENTs (1927); DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR (Bureau of Reclamation), TnE PLACE OF HDno-
ELECTRIC POWER IN RECLAMATION (1940).
26. See U. S. ATTORNEY GEN.ERALs COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE Pnocwurx,
REPORT, DEPARTMENT Or WAR (1940); INSTITUTE FOR GoVERNMEN-r REsmcu, TnE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEERS OF THE AuY (1923); NAT. RESOURCES Co =Trr REP.,
FEDERAL AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH WATER USE AND CONTROL (1936) 21-2.
27. "The land phase of the water problem involves the planned use and treatment of
drainage areas to retard run-off, and thereby to reduce soil erosion and sedimentation, to
lessen flood damages and to alleviate the effects of drought by subsoil storage" NAT.
RESOURCES COMMITTEE REP., supra note 25, at 106. See also Bennett, Soil Conserration
Among the 48 States (1945) 18 ST. GovT. 173; DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, A STA.NDARD STATE
SoIL CONSERVATION DISTRICTS LAW (1936) and STATE LEGISLATION FOR BETmr LAND
USE (1941) 35-7.
28. The functions of the Commission are treated comprehensively in BAUM, op. cit.
supra note 20; CusmuaN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941) 275-97;
FOSTER, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE JURISDICTION (1940).
29. See the discussion between Senator Murray and the head of the Soil Conservation
Bureau in Hearings before Committee on Irrigation and Redarnation on S. 555, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945) 145:
1947]
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late federal activities in the Missouri Valley region.a0 The logical conse-
quence has been a haphazard development of resources accompanied by
bitter jurisdictional conflicts." Moreover, Congressional statutes defining
the functions of the various national agencies have attempted to compart-
mentalize responsibility for particular water uses despite the fact that the
development of the multi-purpose project has rendered any rigid segregation
impossible.1
2
Thus, legal restrictions on the Bureau of Reclamation confine its activities
to a territorially delineated area in seventeen western states and to projects
deemed "economically feasible." 11 The Bureau is impotent to prevent the
Senator Murray: "I would like to ask you . . . if the Soil Conservation
Service is in full agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation and Grazing Division
on conservation?"
Mr. Bennett: "I do not think I can answer that question just at the moment.
We have had so much work to do on this job . . . that maybe we have been a little
negligent about going around seeing what other boys are doing."
See also NAT. RESOURCES COMMITTEE REP., REGIONAL PLANNING (1936) Part 1, 178;
MEAD, FEDERAL RECLAmATION WHAT IT SHOULD INCLUDE (1926) 3; RANS,,iEIER, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 425; Cooke, Rivers and Prosperity (1944) 111 NEW REPUBLIC 8251 826;
Pritchett, Coordinated Control of Water Resources (1945) 18 ST. GovT. 27-8.
30. See Hearings Before Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation on S. 555, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945) 383. The results of the uncoordinated federal programs on the Missouri
River were bitterly described by a proponent of the Missouri Valley Authority in Hearings
Before Committee on Commerce on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 293:
"According to the hostile press we had the advantage of 'seasoned' agencies
with long experience, while down in the Tennessee Valley the people were at the
mercy of undisciplined faddists. Well, a lot of us would like to trade. Our hard-
headed men with their tested agencies are still with us. So are our floods. So is our
balky river. So is our problem of soil erosion. So are our millions of semiarid acres
which could be irrigated."
31. (a) Between the Departments of War, Interior, and Agriculture prior to the Fed.
eral Power Commission, see CUSMIAN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 275-6. (b) Between the
Federal Power Commission, the Corps of Engineers, and the States, see BAUM, Op. Cit, supra
note 20, at 127; FEDERAL POWER COMInsSION REPORT (1939) 18. (c) Between the De-
partments of Agriculture and Interior, see note 29 supra. (d) Between subdivisions of the
Department of the Interior, see statement of Secretary Ickes:
"The various agencies in the Department . . . cannot always resolve among
themselves . . . the conflicts that inevitably arise between their several programs
of resource conservation and development. It is no rare occurrence, but practically
a daily event, for such problems to be laid before me."
Hearings before the Committee on Commerce on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 120. (e)
Between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers, id. at 3, 9, 252, 271, 295-7;
91 CONG. REc. 1155 (1945); Howard, Golden River (1945) 190 HARPERS 511; Hearings before
Committee oi Irrigation and Reclamation on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 52-3, 185,
227-9.
32. The technical advantages of the multi-purpose project are detailed in RANSmEIER,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 102-29; DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECLAMATION' HANDBoon (1942)
1-3; LILIENTHAL, TVA-DEOCRAcY ON THE MARCH (1944) 48-50; Lilienthal, A New
Way-An Old Task (1945) 18 ST. GOVT. 23-4.
33. See NAT. RESOURCES COmMITTEE REP., DRAINAGE BASIN PROBLEMS AND PRO-
GRAMS (1937 Rev.) 83; DEP'T OF TEE INTERIOR, op. cit. supra note 32, at 12, 35-6, 40; MEAD,
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destructive silting of its reservoirs and to increase the flow of water to its
works because the necessary powers are lodged in other agencies.3 4 The
Corps of Engineers may not investigate projects without Congressional
authorization or undertake construction until appropriations have been
voted;35 and, as the Missouri River controversy indicates, the success of its
down-stream flood control program may be directly contingent upon up-
stream diversions under the control of a separate federal department." The
ambitious plans of the Soil Conservation Bureau cannot be effectuated
without powers of land planning, zoning, and eminent domain presently
vested in the individual states.n Although the Federal Power Commission
is charged with the administration of the national power policy, it may only
recommend that power facilities be added to War Department dams; : and
both the Bureau of Reclamation, the world's largest operator of power in-
stallations,39 and the Tennessee Valley Authority are exempt from its regu-
THE PLAcE OF FEDERAL RECLAutATION IN A FEDERAL LAND POLICy (1931) 4. Moreover, all
reclamation projects must be transferred to private water user associations as soon as prac-
ticable. See DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TaE BuREAu OF RECLAmTiON; ITs Fuxcnons ,ND
ACCOMPLISHMENTS (1927) 21. And Congressional appropriations must precede whole or
part construction of all projects. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, op. cit. supra note 32, at 37.
34. Neither the Bureau of Reclamation nor the Corps of Engineers has the authority
to hold the rain where it falls, to minimize run-off waters, and to halt overstocking of the
ranges. It is estimated that 16 per cent of the capacity of the Guernsey Reservoir has con-
sequently become filled with silt. See statements of Mr. Bashore and Mr. Cooke in Hearings
Before Committee on Commerce on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 159, and Hearings
Before Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation on S. 555,79th Cong., lst Sess. (1945) 256.
35. See statements of Major General Reybold and Senator Overton, Hearings Before
Committee on Commerce on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 303, 307.
36. The Corps of Engineers, supported by the lower basin states, offered a plan for
flood control in the Missouri Valley in 1943. Almost simultaneously, the Bureau of Reclama-
tion, with the backing of the upper basin states, presented a totally different scheme di-
rected at irrigation and reclamation improvement. The Corps of Engineers planned to use
Ft. Peck, Garrison Dam, and two large reservoirs for flood control; the Bureau of Reclama-
tion insisted upon the use of the same waters for irrigation, and upon the construction of 27
small installations in the place of the two Army reservoirs. Both bureaus openly condemned
each other's projects as expensive and totally unnecessary but a hasty compromise was ar-
ranged shortly after the introduction into Congress of Senator Murray's bill for a Missouri
Valley Authority. For details of the "shameless, loveless, shot-gun wedding," see Howard,
Golden River (May 1945) 190 HARPERS 511.
37. The federal government may acquire property within a state without local consent
only in the exercise of a constitutional federal public purpose; to effectuate a "public pur-
pose" of the state, local eminent domain powers must be utilized. See United States v.
Eighty Acres of Land, 26 F. Supp. 315 (E. D. I1. 1939); United States v. Dieclmann, 101
F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939). The broad state land regulatory powers are discussed in
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE LEGISLATION FOR BETTER LAND UsE (1941).
38. 49 STAT. 839 (1935), 16 U. S. C. § 797 (a) (1940). Since the statute does not re-
quire the War Department to follow this recommendation, the plans of the two agencies
frequently diverge. See BAU, op. cit. supra note 20, at 129; FEDERAL POWER ConMISSION
REPORT (1939) 18.
39. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECLAuATION HANDBOOx (1942) 13; Hearings Before
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation on S. 555,79th Cong., IstSess. (1945) 360.
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lation. 40 The Commission has been designated the quasi-coordinator of the
water development schemes of private industry; but its authority extends
only to the licensing of particular dams, 41 and under existing decisions it is
unable to protect its own licensees from damage suits in the state courts
stemming from the very water diversions which it has authorized.
42
Regional Valley Authorities. To escape the administrative rigidity charac-
teristic of the regular federal department, Congress may immunize indi-
vidual bureaus from existing restrictions 41 or create government corpora-
tions which enjoy characteristics both of independent private entities and
of national instrumentalities. 4" Thus, federal corporations have been held
suable in tort and contract, liable to attachment and perhaps garnishment,
free from supervision by the Comptroller-General and the Director of the
Budget, exempt from federal purchasing, expenditure, and civil service re-
quirements, and subject to certain minor burdens which non-corporate
agencies evade;45 yet, simultaneously, corporations have been found im-
40. See BAUM, op. cit. supra note 20, at 101, n. 74. A series of statutes has given tie
Commission authority to prescribe a uniform accounting system for the TVA, to examine
proposed contracts covering loans from TVA to public bodies and non-profit organizations,
and to consult with the Bonneville Project Administrator on the sale and disposition of
electrical energy. See Lewis, The Role of the Federal Power Commission Regarding the Power
Features of Federal Projects (1945) 14 GEo. WAsn. L. REv. 96 passim.
41. 'Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act charges the Commission with ensuring that
each licensed project will be "best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or de-
veloping a waterway . . . for the . . . benefit of interstate . . . commerce, . .. utiliza-
tion of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses. . .. ." See BAUM,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 91. Under Section 9(b) the Commission must be satisfied that all
applicants have complied with state law; but if state requirements conflict with the Federal
Power Act, the Commission need not demand such compliance. See First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 66 Sup. Ct. 906, 914 (U. S. 1946).
42. Henry Ford and Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U.S. 369 (1930); United States v.
Central Stockholders Corp., 43 F. (2d) 977 (S. D. Cal. 1930); Herminghaus v. Southern
California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 Pac. 607 (1926). The present Supreme Court, how-
ever, may well withdraw its protection of "property" rights in subsequent cases involving
federal licensees. Compare United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499, 510
(1945).
43. See Wehle, Government-Controlled Business Corporations in America and Europe
(1935) 10 TULANE L. REv. 94, 99; Reed, Government-Owned Business Corporations in the
United States (1935) 10 TULANE L. REv. 79, 85; Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and
Their Legal Problems (1936) 14 N. C. L. REv. 238, 248.
44. "It is difficult to quarrel with the result reached in any of these decisions taken
singly, but it has become equally difficult to predict when the interposition of the separate
entity of the corporate agency will be ignored and when it will be given considerable weight
or even taken as controlling." Glick, The Federal Subsistence Homesteads Program (1935)
44 YALE L. J. 1324, 1354. Since there is no general federal incorporation statute, each cor-
poration must be formed by separate act, its legality depending upon the purposes for
which it was created. See Culp, Creation of Government Corporations by the National Govern.
ment (1935) 33 MicH. L. REv. 473, 490-511; McGuire, Some Problems Arising from Govern.
ment Corporations (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 778, 782-4.
45. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1940) (garnishment);
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381 (1939) (suability); Federal
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mune from state taxation and regulation, entitled to governmental priority
and rates for telegraph service, and not subject to defenses based upon the
statute of limitations.46 Likewise, frauds against a national corporation
may be considered frauds against the government itself, and the United
States regarded as the real party plaintiff in a suit by the corporation on a
contract.47
The success of the Tennessee Valley Authority is at least partially at-
tributable to the freedom of operation and management and the adminis-
trative flexibility characteristic of the corporate form.43 It has benefited
substantially from the financial freedom achieved by the power to issue obli-
gations and to utilize its revenues for current activites , 3 Moreover, the
Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 232 (1935) (attachment); United States ex reI. Skinner
and Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, 8 (1927) (immunity from audit of Comptroller
General); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549 (1922)
(suability); Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 Ad. 788 (1920) (garnish-
ment); VAN DORN, GovERN ENT OWNED CORPORATIONS (1926) 26S; Wa.iNT'ILnu, GoVEr.n-
mENT CoRPoRATioNs AND STATE LAW (1939) 17; PUrcaETr, THE TEN.ESsEE VAu.LEY
AuTHoaiTy (1943) 228. But there are a few cases contra. See McCarthy v. U. S. S. B.
Merchant Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C. 1931) (garnishment); Home Ovner?'
Loan Corp. v. Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, 100 S. NV. (2d) 238 (1936) (garnishment);
Comment (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 346, 353. A government corporation cannot claim
the priority in bankruptcy to which the United States is entitled, and it may be estopped by
the conduct of its officers. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
supra; Providence Engr. Corp. v. Downey Shipbuilding Corp., 294 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1923).
46. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 415 (1928)
(reduced rates for telegraph messages); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341
(1923) (immunity from state taxation); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276 (1899) (immunity
from state regulation); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Pennsyl%ania,
125 U. S. 181, 190 (1888) (immunity from state regulation); Posey v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 93 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) (freedom from state regulation); United
States v. Coghlan, 261 Fed. 425 (D. Md. 1919) (immunity from state taxation); United
States v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 211, 160 N. E. 13 (1928) (not subject to statute of limitation).
But see The No. 34, 11 F. (2d) 287 (D. Mass. 1925) (laches can be set up as a defense).
47. Erickson v. United States, 264 U.S. 246 (1924); United States v. Waiter, 263 U.S.
15 (1923); United States v. Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 40 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930);
United States v. Carlin, 259 Fed. 904 (E. D. Pa. 1917). Glick, supra note 44, at 1353.
Contra: United States v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 52 F. (2d) 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1931);
Salas v. United States, 234 Fed. 842 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916). Compare United States v. Strang,
254 U.S. 491 (1921).
48. HODGE, TnE TENNESSEE VALLEY AuTHORITY (1938) 228-9. The constitutionality
of the Tennessee Valley Authority has been established, albeit partially through default.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936); Tennessee Electric Power
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Grant v. Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, 49 F. Supp. 564 (E. D. Tenn. 1942); Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 F. (2d)
95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939); PIuTCaETT, op. cit. supra note 45, at 65.
49. The TVA does not wholly conform to the typical pattern of corporate financial
characteristics since it is largely dependent upon periodic Congressional appropriations. See
REGIONAL FACTORS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 114; Pritchett, op. cit. supra note 45, at 266.
The early practice was for the United States to assume no responsibility for corporate obliga-
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semi-autonomous nature of the Authority has facilitated experimentation
with a regional approach impossible with federal agencies which must refer
all important decisions to a department head in Washington. The principal
contribution of the Valley Authority principle, however, lies in its repudia-
tion of the attempt to divide natural resources so as to conform to the or-
ganization chart of the national government.5 0 In consequence, it envisages
an integration into a single administrative agency of all federal authority
and responsibility for regional planning and development. 1 The chief legal
deficiency of Valley Authority legislation is perhaps the failure to authorize
an analogous fusion of federal and state powers, the absence of which renders
the success of federal programs contingent upon continuous, voluntary,
local cooperation.
The states have at, their disposal positive means of hindering the opera-
tion of any federal valley authority. They might require the corporation to
secure certificates of convenience or necessity, refuse to approve particular
purchases, leases or extensions, prescribe electrical rates and terms of serv-
ice, or levy inspection, license or other taxes; efforts to regulate corporate
accounting practices, examine records, or inquire into management might
also be made.52 In addition, full local participation which is essential to the
national program might be impeded by the failure to enact special enabling
and permissive legislation. Thus the states, in order to ensure cooperation
with other federal corporations, have in the past authorized their executive
agencies or political subdivisions to invest in corporate bonds, borrow money
unhampered by constitutional debt limitations, construct and operate elec-
trical plants and transmission lines, contract freely for corporate electricity,
tons, but Congress now fully guarantees the bonds of the TVA, the HOLC, and the RFC.
McDIARMD, GOVERNMNT CoR'oRAZIoNs AND FEDERAL FUNDS (1938) 64-5.
50. "The Tennessee Valley's resources were not . . . dissected into separate bits that
would fit into the jurisdictional pigeonholes into which the instrumentalities of government
had by custom become divided." Lilienthal, A New Way-An Old Task (1945) 18 ST.
GovT. 23. See also REGIONAL FACTORS, op. cil. supra note 2, at 83; Cooke, Rivers and Pros-
perity (1944) 111 NEw REPUBLI 825.
51. The Tennessee Valley Authority has cooperated with and utilized the services of
the old line federal departments on different occasions but has always retained responsibility
for valley programs. See HODGE, op. cit. supra note 48, at 113-28. In the past ten years the
record of collaboration has been so successful that not a single conflict has arisen between
the Authority and a federal department necessitating a conference with the President.
LiLiENTHAL, TVA-DEiocRAcy ON THE MARCh (1944)165.
52. See Comment (1934) 44 Yale L. J. 326, 331. Local public service agencies originally
attempted to assert jurisdiction over the Tennessee Valley Authority but subsequent legis-
lation and decisions exempted the Corporation from this regulation. See Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Kinzer, 142 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944); Posey v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 93 F. (2d) 726, 727 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). The Authority, by Congressional mandate,
now pays large sums to state and local agencies in lieu of taxes. This procedure has been
termed ". . . almost as bad as charging Santa Claus for the privilege of coming down the
chimney." Edelmann, Public Ownership and Ta: Replacement by the TVA (1941) 35 A.
POL. Sc. Rxv. 727, 733.
[Vol. 56 1 276
GOVERNMENTAL TECHNIQUES
facilitate the erection of local sewage disposal plants, form soil conservation
districts, accept lump sum payments in lieu of taxes, and actively encourage
extensions of rural electrification.
53
The success of a valley authority may also depend upon the voluntary
exercise of important powers bearing upon water resource development
currently vested in the states. 54 Local governments may, for example, assist
the national flood-control program by exercising powers of rural zoning to
prevent construction and residence in flood-hazard areas, or perhaps to
restrict such lands to forestry, grazing, and recreation. State legislatures
alone can modify the existing doctrines of water rights which frequently
assign to specified lands water which could be put to better use on soil of
higher productivity. State enactment of strict farm-tenancy laws would
directly aid a national erosion policy inasmuch as better soil conservation
practices tend to appear on lands subject to continuous owner operation.
The power of the states to purchase and condemn property may be employed
to rotate soil-depleting crops or to supplement rural zoning by the removal
of non-conforming uses. In addition, local executive agencies may be dele-
gated authority to plan and develop intra-state streams, select appropriate
project sites thereon, retard run-off waters, regulate range practices, en-
courage reforestation, and abate pollution.55
The experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority has demonstrated that
administrative cooperation with the individual states is essential to an
effective regional plan.5 6 In its water control program, for example, the
53. See Key, Staie Legislation Facilitative of Federal Action (1940) 207 ANNALS 7, 8-11;
WENTRAuB, op. cit. supra note 45, at 121-6. In Nevada a constitutional amendment was
adopted to ensure state participation in the Boulder Dam Program. Communication to
YALE LAW JouRNAL from the Attorney General of Nevada, June 28, 1946. The enabling
legislation enacted by the Tennessee Valley states has in general withstood constitutional
attacks. See Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 229 Ala. 50, 155 So. 859 (1934); Memphis
Power and Light'Co. v. Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 112 S. IV. (2d) 817 (1937). But ef. City of
Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833, 146 S. WV. (2d) 48 (1940).
54. See DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE LEGISLATION FOR BETTER L,%im UsE (1941)
especially 8,30-2,46, 88, 114.
55. Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal. 593, 213 Pac. 983 (1923) (determining the feasibility
of projects); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 230 Mass. 6, 118 N. E. 643 (1918) (issuing pollution
abatement regulations); State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637
(1935) (construction of irrigation and flood control project); Conway v. New Hampshire
Water Resources Board, 89 N. H. 346, 199 At. 83 (1938); Clarke v. South Carolina Public
Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481 (1935) (construction of power and navigation
projects). In one case, however, Blackstone, Montesquieu and Story were invo!zed as
authority for denying to a commission the right to exercise discretion in the choice of project
sites. Hodges v. Public Service Commission, 110 W. Va. 649,159 S. E. 834 (1931).
56. It has been estimated that the Authority cooperates with 160 national, state, and
local governmental agencies plus 79 voluntary lay organizations. See HODGE, op. Cit. Ulpfr
note 48, at 114-5, 119-22, 126, 130-8, 150-5, 160-1, 184-98; REGIONAL FAcroRs, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 99-102; LILIENTHAL, TVA-DEmocRAcY ON1 THE MARCH (1944) 81-2, 127,
132, 135; Satterfield, TVA-Stae-Local Relationships (1946) 40 Au. POL. Sc. REv. 935
passim.
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Authority relies on state highway departments for construction data and
advice, on state relief offices for labor, on local agencies for geological infor-
mation and assistance, and on the state universities for engineering facilities
and personnel. Seven land-grant colleges furnish reports on soil and fertilizer
-requirements, perform research for new plant foods, and make available
their laboratories and experimental farms to demonstrate crop rotation,
farm practices, and fertilizer use. State farm organizations have made ex-
perimental plantings of vegetables and fiber flax and have assisted the Au-
thority in the discovery and production of a new phosphate chemical for
soil revitalization. Local forestry bureaus have been instrumental in fire
prevention, wildlife conservation, and migratory bird control.
The large concentrations of population in dam areas have produced cer-
tain health problems, such as the control of malaria, which the Authority has
solved through state public health agencies. Official intra-state planning
bodies have made studies of land use, public works, and resources, which are
of great value to the Authority. Moreover, the entire electrical program
would be adversely affected if municipalities were unable to purchase Au-
thority electricity or if the wholesale power contracts were invalidated by
the state courts; in one instance, the Authority saved $15,000 as a result of
a single town ordinance permitting it to locate transmission lines along
particular streets.
The techniques employed for this Federal-State cooperation have included
the exchange of data and personnel, informal understandings, direct joint
committees, financial assistance, and written contracts. Formal agreements
are the basis of the electrical distribution system and bind the municipalities
or cooperatives to adopt rate schedules, administer their electrical systems
and accounts, and apply their revenues in conformity with federal specifica-
tions. Written agreements have been utilized in other Authority programs,
including Agriculture, Fertilizer, Health, Education, and Stream Pollution.
The achievements in the Tennessee Valley have served to encourage pro-
ponents of federal regulation of water resources and, in consequence, ten
new proposals for regional valley authorities are now before Congress.? The
most prominent example of this legislation is the Murray bill for the Missouri
Valley which is modeled directly after the Tennessee Valley Authority with
certain modifications to meet the requirements of the semi-arid western
region. However, other measures which have been introduced subject the
proposed government corporation to the direct control of the Department
of the Interior or other bureau head, thus destroying the autonomous nature
of the Authority.58 '
57. For a discussion of the various proposals see Clark, Proposed "Valley Authority"
Legislation (1946) 40 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 62; Erickson, A Missouri Valley Alithority-.It
Effect Upon Water Appropriation, Use, State Control and Vested Rights (1945) 18 RocKY MT.
L. REv. 1; Slaughter, Valley Authority Bills (1945) 6 FED. B. J. 316.
58. The Department of the Interior proposal was outlined by Secretary Ickes in Hear-
ings Before Committee On Commerce on S. 555, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 126-32. It re-
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STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR THE CONTROL OF DRAINAGE
BASINS
All "encroachments" by the federal government through valley authorities
have been resisted by those who profess to view the Authority device as a
"super-state" and who visualize solution of water problems through state or
interstate action; and indeed, in recent years, there has been a growing
recognition by the states of their responsibilities in the field of resources de-
velopment. Thus, the state governments have frequently created intra-state
planning agencies with a specific mandate to cooperate with similar bodies
in neighboring states. 9 For more serious and complicated regional problems,
interstate commissions and compacts have thus far been utilized 0'3
Interstate Planning Commissions. In 1936 the Interstate Commission of
the Delaware River was constituted by New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, and Delaware to serve as a fact-finding body, a planning organ, and a
correlator of all programs relating to the Delaware Basin.0 ' INCODEL re-
sembles the informal regional planning commissions of New England and
the Pacific Northwest in its lack of coercive authority, but deviates from
this pattern in the absence of direct federal representation on the Commis-
sion and its semi-official statutory position. 2 Through its powers of persua-
ceived a cool reception from the supporters of the autonomous Valley authority principle,
one of whom commented: "We don't mean to imply . . . that Mr. Ickes' ambitions have
no bounds .... He has as yet shown no desire to take over the Army, the Navy, or the
State Department." Howard, Golden River (May 1945) 190 HARPERS 511, 521.
59. New Mexico and Colorado each set up an executive agency headed by the state
engineer to administer the La Plata Compact. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 97 (1938). And New York and New Jersey originally did
likewise to preserve the Palisades Interstate Park. See ComssioN oF = PALiSADEs
PARK-Nnw YoRK (Annual Report 1926) 4.
60. The chief legal basis for state regulation of water resources is their plenary power
over internal commerce, regardless of navigability. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195
(U. S. 1824); United States v. Appalachian Elect. Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769, 779 (C. C. A.
4th, 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 311 U. S. 377 (1940). The "Silence of Congre&' doctrine
furnishes authority to the states to regulate navigable interstate waters subject to the
superior rights of the federal government. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 548 (1886);
Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683 (1882); United States v. Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 702 (1899). But for a searching criticism of the "silence"
doctrine, see Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause (1936) 3 U. oF Cm.
L. REv. 556, 588.
61. Robinson, Voluntary Regionalism in the Control of Water Resources (1940) 207 AN-
NALS 116, 118; INTERSTATE COMUSSION ON rME DELAWARE RVER BAsIN ANNUAL REPORT
(1945) 8; Turner, The Place of the States in the Field of Watershed Derelopment (1945) 18
ST. GovT. 19, 22; Allen, The Delaware River Basin (1944) 36 J. Ass. WATER WVoRKs Ass's
1,3.
62. For a review of the organization and activities of the informal regional planning
commissions, see NAT. REsouRcEs CommTTEE REP., Regional Planning Part I and Part III
(1936); HODGE, op. cit. supra note 48, at 17-24. INCODEL derives its authority from the joint
legislative commissions on interstate cooperation which were established by the basin states.
Robinson, supra note 61, at 119.
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sion, INCODEL induced the basin states to sign an agreement for the abate-
ment of stream pollution and prepared the plans which were subsequently
adopted by Pennsylvania for ridding the Schuylkill River of silt and culm
from coal mine operations. 3 A twenty-five year old water diversion dispute
between New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania was settled through the
Commission after a Supreme Court decision had failed to satisfy the par-
ties.64 With more than fifty per cent of the growth-producing cover of agri-
cultural areas washed away, INCODEL is currently engaged in the formu-
lation of a joint state program for forest development and soil conservation.
Moreover, it has assisted the federal government in the preparation of flood
control plans for the basin area. Yet the limited annual budget under which
it functions, 5' the failure to combine powers of planning with powers of
development,66 the frequent resort to federal funds and agencies, 7 and the
ever-present possibility that it may be rendered totally impotent by the
recalcitrance of a single state,68 suggest the chief deficiencies of INCODEL
as a model device for future regional development without detracting from
its indisputable value for the preparation of plans and the collation of basic
data.
Interstate Compacts. A more formal and comprehensive coordination of
63. See Robinson, supra note 61, at 120; ANNUAL REPORT, op. cit. supra note 61, at
18-20. In other states, the exemption of important industries coupled with inadequate
delegations of administrative discretion and power have rendered ineffective anti-pollutlon
legislation. NAT'L RESOURCES COMMITTEE REP., Water Pollution in the United States
(1939) 70-1.
64. "Although more than twenty-five years and a million dollars were spent in litigating
the problem before the United States Supreme Court in 1930, the basic question of the
respective rights and responsibilities of the States was not settled by this controversy.
ANNUAL REPORT, Op. cit. supra note 61, at 21.
65. The Commission prides itself on its small budget. "A thirty-five thousand dollar
per year budget does not permit it to embark upon any all-inclusive, broad-range program
of activities. That is a good thing. It effectively prevents any thought of spreading out too
ambitiously." Id. at 13-4.
66. Significantly, other informal regional planning commissions have recognized their
deficiencies and have recommended supplemental legislation including public corporations
and compacts. See PACIFIc NORTHwEST REGIONAL PLANNING COMISSION REP. (1935)
28-30; ST. Lois REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION REP. (1936) 1, 62; NEw ENGLAND
REGIONAL PLANNING ComrmssioN REP. (1936) 61.
67. Although pollution control is generally regarded as a state problem, extensive
operations in that field are beyond the capacity of the states. Thus, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation financed a $10,000,000 plant for industrial waste regulation, and the
Corps of Engineers has assisted in the dredging operations on the Schuylkill River. REr.
op. cit. supra note 61, at 19-20. For a brief summary of INCODEL's relations with federal
planning and investigatory agencies, see Stevenson, Quality and Quantity: Cooperative En-
gineering in the Delaware Basin (1937) 10 ST. GOVT. 115.
68. "If any state or any authorized representative of a state is not willing to bear a
share of the Commission's work or to agree in the programs which have been co-operatively
formulated, the work of all is to that extent crippled." Robinson, supra note 61, at 122.
And INCODEL concedes that only a federal corporation can operate in regions where the
states have serious social and political differences. See Turner, supra note 61, at 21.
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local authority over interstate waters is illustrated by the use of the compact
clause of the Federal Constitution, as exemplified by the Colorado River
Compact, to reach basic agreement on water apportionment. This method
facilitates the application of technical engineering sllls to the complex prob-
lems, avoids continuous litigation, and provides an effective outlet for local
responsibility and participation in regional programs.c But the process of
negotiation is tedious, and the normal method of amendment cumbersome
and inflexible.70 Adjustments recorded by compact are too often the product
of political compromise and bargaining power rather than efficient water
plannirig. The process of formulating a compact assumes the sovereign
equality of the negotiants, whereas effective water planning demands a dis-
tribution along lines of maximum utility regardless of state boundaries.7
Although the legal problems inherent in the compact method have not
been fully explored, certain tentative hypotheses may be advanced. The
power of the states to compact with one another and with the federal govern-
ient is said to be qualified by the compact clause itself,7- by other relevant
provisions of the federal constitution,73 and by individual state constitutional
69. The various advantages of the compact method have been dealt with at length.
See for example Donovan, State Compacts as a Metlwd of Settling Problems Common to Ser-
eral States (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 5, 8-15; DniocK AND BENSON, CAN% INTERSTATE
COMPACTS SUCCEED (1937) 3-4; Corry, The Federal Dilemma (1941) 7 CAN. J. Eco.. AND
POL. Sci. 215, 221-2; Communication to Y, LE LAW JouRuAxL. from the Attorney General
of New Mexico, June 29, 1946. For a listing of the important interstate water compacts,
see Ireland, supra note 12.
70. It has taken 14 years to negotiate a compact for the abatement of pollution in the
Ohio Valley and final agreement has not yet been achieved. See Reid, Pollution Control-A
Post-war Public Works Opportunilty for the Staes (1945) 18 ST. Govr. 30,32.
71. "Sectional prejudice, politiral expediency, and other irrelevant, often selfish, con-
siderations which have no relation whatever to the merits of the proposition, are apt to be
controlling, and the considerations which may influence the legislature of one state may be
totally different from those which influence ...another state." Minard, The Future of
Water Allocation and Deelopments in Interstate Agreements (1937) 29 J. A. WV,XETFR Wonrxs
Ass'N 942, 946. For discussion of the disadvantages inherent in the compact method, see
GRAVEs, Uxmomn STATE AcTIoN (1934) 24; Routt, Interstate Compacts and Administratie
Cooperation (1940) 207 ANNALs 93, 95; Corwin, The Lessons of the Colorado Rier Compact
(1927) 16 NAT. MuN. REV. 459, 461; Clark, Interstate Compacts and Social Legislation II
(1936) 51 POL. Sci. Q. 36,42-3.
72. See Notes (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 76, 77, (1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 618, 619-20;
OLSON, THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT (1926) 66; REP. Comnsssio.NERs Ox CoWA'10 to
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UxnwoRu STATE LAWS (1917) 1-2. But a strong argument is
often made to the effect that all compacts need not be approved by Congress. See V"irginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 520-1 (1893); Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States
with One Another and With Foreign Powers (1918) 2 MINN. L. REv. 500, 516; ELY, OIL CoN-
SERVATIOx THROUGH INTERSTATE AGREEMENT (1933) 389-93.
73. The 14th Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Treaty
Power, and the Impairment of Contracts Prohibition are cited as restraints on state author-
ity to compact. Donovan, The Constilutional AuWhority of Screral States to Dcal Jointly With
Social and Labor Problems (1936) 20 MARQ. L. REv. 78, 79; OLsON, op. Cit. supra note 72, at
68; Burke, Interstate Compacts (1936) 29 PA. B. A. Q. 25, 30; Note (1938) 23 IowA L. REV.
1947]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
barriers.7 4 By seemingly incongruous reasoning, 6 such agreements have been
held "binding" upon the legislatures, administrative officials, courts, and
citizens of the signatory states.76 A compact may be enforced against a de-
fendant state solely by suit of another signatory to the agreement, but its
validity may be challenged by individual citizens in both local and federal
courts. The interpretation of a compact does not of itself present a federal
question, and, where the states themselves are not parties to an action,
federal jurisdiction must be predicated upon diversity of citizenship.77 In at
least one case, specific performance was granted by the Supreme Court, and
it is possible that the traditional remedies of injunction, mandamus, or
money damages for breach may also lie.7 However, the execution of a
judgment for money damages presents serious legal difficulties because the
Supreme Court cannot compel state legislatures to levy taxes or make ap-
propriations; nor may it seize property held for public purposes to satisfy a
judgment. 9 Not infrequently, recalcitrant states have openly defied the
618, 624, 628-9; La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 101 Col. 73,
70 P. (2d) 849 (1937) rev'd 304 U. S. 92 (1938); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 433 (U. S. 1855); Hancock v. Walsh, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6012, at
407 (C. C. IV. D. Tex. 1879).
74. See Note (1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 618, 629.
75. Compare the various theories in Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 91 (U. S. 1823);
Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140, 162 (1911); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and
Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 565 (U. S. 1851); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 519
(1906); Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cher!y Creek Ditch Co., 304 t. S. 92, 109 (1938),
See Note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 76, 84; Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 324, 329-30.
76. Binding upon state legislatures: Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39 (U. S. 1870);
Bass. v. Dinwiddie, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1092 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1812); President, Managers
et al. v. Trenton City Bridge Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 46 (1860); Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. REV. 169,
170. But if a compact does bind future state legislature% what becomes of the doctrine that
there is no irrepealable law? See Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 559 (1879).
Binding upon individual citizens: Poole v. Fleeger, 11 Pet. 185, 209 (U. S. 1837); Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 725 (U. S. 1838); Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106 (1938) (even upon those whose "rights" antedate tho
compact). Binding upon administrative oflicials: Kansas City v. Fairfax Drainage District,
34 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929); State ex rel. Baird v. Joslin, 116 Kan. 615, 227 Pac. 543
(1924). Binding upon the courts: Couch v. State, 140 Tenn. 156, 203 S. W. 831 (1918).
77. People of New York v. Central Railroad of New Jersey, 12 Wall. 455 (U. S. 1870);
Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106 (1938); South
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4 (1876); Clark, supra note 71, at 53, n. 152; Note (1935) 35
COL. L. REv. 76, 86.
78. See Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163 (1930); Note (1935) 35 COL. L. Rav. 76, 86.
In Kentucky v. Denison, 24 How. 66, 109-10 (U. S. 1860), the Supreme Court indicated that
it was without authority to mandamus the Governor of the state, but its decision in Virginia
v. West Virginia, 246 U. S. 565, 591 (1918) appears to represent a wholly different attitude.
Curiously, the Court has not been equally reluctant to coerce action by municipalities
through the writ of mandamus. Labette County Commissioners v. Moulton, 112 U. S. 217
(1884).
79. See Long, The Enforcement of Judgments Against a State (1916) 4 VA. L. REV. 157,




decisions of the Supreme Court.8 0 It thus appears that the enforcement of a
compact against a signatory state rests ultimately upon public opinion and
voluntary cooperation rather than upon hypothetical legal remedies.8 '
Interstate Public Autlwrities. An escape from the necessity of submitting
the interpretation of all compact provisions to the courts is afforded by
superimposing a Public Authority upon the agreement and vesting it with
sufficient powers to furnish continuous administrative supervision8 2 The
first agency of this nature was the Port of New York Authority, created in
1921 by New York and New Jersey to effectuate a comprehensive plan for
the development of the port.8 3 By the compact the Authority was granted
power to purchase, construct, lease, and operate terminal and transportation
facilities within the port district with a view to simplifying freight move-
ments. Although it may make recommendations to the state legislatures, it
has no power to compel the carriers to unify their facilities. The George
Washington Bridge, the Bayonne Bridge, the Lincoln Tunnel, and the In-
land Railroad Terminal Number I in New York are examples of its successful
operations in the construction field. The Authority appears regularly before
the Interstate Commerce Commission in port differential cases, and before
the Maritime Commission in matters relating to steamship schedules and
rates; but with the exception of recommendations to the Corps of Engineers
with respect to channels, anchorages and pier lines, it has never attempted
to control the interstate waters of the Hudson River. 4
Although the Public Authority device has withstood severe constitutional
attacks premised on local home rule provisions, state debt limitations, and
the delegation of powers theory, serious difficulties remain in addition to the
normal compact enforcement problems.8 5 The courts and commentators
80. See Lay, Interstate Controversies (1920) 54 AM. L. REV. 705; Putney, The President,
The Constitution, and the Supreme Court (1935) 1 ED. RES. REP. 451,455; Rosenberg, Braturd
Fulmen-A Precedent For a World Court (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 783, 787-9. For a recent
illustration see Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, 146 Neb. 429, 19 N. W. (2d) 853 (1945).
81. See VARREN, THE SuPansiE COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES (1924) 87-9; Dwoca
AND BENSON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 17; Clark, Interstate Compacts and Social Legislation II
(1936) 51 POL. SCI. Q. 36, 52.
82. "If interstate compacts are to promote state co6peration rather than merely to
forestall disputes and litigation, the need for a continuing interstate authority must be
emphasized." Clark, supra note 81, at 43; OLSON, op. cit. supra note 72, at 199-210; RE-
GIONAL FACTORS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 200.
83. The organization and achievements of the Port of New York Authority are dis-
cussed in BARD, THE PORT OF NEW YoRm AUTHORITY (1942); COHEN, THE PORT OF NEW
Yomx AUTHORITY (1940); THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY, A MONOGRAI'u (1936);
NICHOL, THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY (1935).
84. Communication to YALE LAW JouRNAL from the General Counsel of the New York
Port Authority, May 25, 1946.
85. Gaynor v. Marohn, 268 N.Y. 417, 198 N. E. 13 (1935); Robertson v. Zimmermann,
268 N.Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (1935); Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173
Aft. 289 (1934); Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York, 282 N. Y. 306, 26 N. E. (2d) 269
(1940); Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N. Y. 464, 198 N. E. 225 (1935); Dep't of Water and Power of
Los Angeles v. Vroman, 218 Cal. 206,22 P. (2d) 698 (1933).
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have declared that an Authority is vested with the essential legal character-
istics and administrative advantages of the government corporation; 8 but
in New York and New Jersey, the Port of New York Authority is not
suable. 87 According to the typical rationale, an Authority is a separate
entity which does not pledge the credit of the government; but if it issues a
mortgage which bears foreclosure rights, the Courts may regard the obliga-
tion as a debt of the state or municipality and, to avert foreclosure, may
invalidate the mortgage."' An important source of revenue may be obtained
through issuance of income bonds, but the rights of these creditors in the
absence of a statute have not been fully defined. The right to institute
receivership proceedings has never been granted, but it has been intimated
that the temporary intervention of trustees may be sustained, an accounting
ordered, or an injunction issued to prevent misapplication of revenues.8 9 A
legal obstacle to the program of any interstate Authority is presented by
the paramount interest of the national government in navigation, which
empowers it to forbid the construction of particular projects or to condemn
those already constructed ° Finally, special problems may be raised by
peculiarities in individual enabling legislation; thus, decisions of the Port of
86. An Authority is regarded as a separate entity and therefore free from state per-
sonnel, compensation and financial regulations. See BARD, op. cit. supra note 83, at 269-72;
NICHOL, op. cit. supra note 83, at 60-1; Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and
Practical Aspects (1937) 47 YALE L. J, 14, 15-6; XI N. Y. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION COMMITTEE (1938) 238-41. Thus, the income, bonds and property of the Port of New
York Authority have been exempted from the federal and state income tax and from local
property, sales, utility, gas, and recording taxes. See Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New
York, 282 N. Y. 306, 26 N. E. (2d) 269 (1940); BARD, op. cit, supra note 83, at 275, 279;
Nehemkis, supra at 27; COHEN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 26.
87. Le Beau Piping Corp. v. City of New York, 170 Misc. 644,9 N. Y. S. (2d) 853 (Sup.
Ct. 1938); Pink v. New York Port Authority, 99 N. Y. L. J. 567 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Voorhis v.
Cornell Contracting Corp., 170 Misc. 908, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 378 (N. Y. City Ct., 1938);
Miller v. Port of New York Authority, f8 N. J. Misc. 601, 15 A. (2d) 262 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797 (D. N. J. 1940).
88. See Nehemkis and Williams, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional
Debt Limitations (1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 177, 197-8; Nehemkis, supra note 86, at 23. Com-
pare City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861 (1902); Lesser v. Warren Borough,
237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912); Boykin v. Town of River Junction, 121 Fla. 902, 164 So.
558 (1935).
89. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 Att. 289 (1934); Clarke v.
South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481 (1935); Alabama
State Bridge Corp. v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695 (1928); Boynton v. Moffat Tunnel
Improvement Dist., 57 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932); George v. City of Asheville, 80 .
(2d) 50, 56-7 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Nehemkis, supra note 86, at 25-6; NicoL, Op. cit. supra
note 83, at 66.
90. Monongohela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336 (1893); Bridge
Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470 (1881); Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. S.
409 (1917); West Chicago Street R. R. v. City of Chicago, 201 U. S. 506 (1906); Cohen,
The New York Harbor Problem and Its Legal Aspects (1920) 5 CORN L. Q, 373, 380-1; NIo.L,
.op. cit. supra note 83, at 73-4.
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New York Authority are subject to veto by the governor of each state, and
all new major projects must be specifically authorized by both legislaturesP
THE FUSION OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWERS
The administrative organs thus far described have not proved completely
satisfactory for the execution of unified regional water programs. Their
principal defect is a failure to coordinate national and local planning and to
combine into a single agency all available federal and state powers of de-
velopment. The following discussion suggests one possible method for
achieving a desirable fusion of federal and state authority in a manner im-
mune from legal attack. It proposes the creation of a national corporation
by Congressional statute and the negotiation of an interstate compact which
embodies a delegation to this Corporation of important state powers over
water resources.1
2
In order to eliminate the jurisdictional conflicts between national bureaus
competing for water, all federal powers for regional development should be
centralized in a single agency; the flexibility of the corporate form suggests
its utility for the purpose of regional administration. This Corporation
should be modeled in functions and organization along the lines of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, but would be established by a more specific
Congressional mandate. Enabling legislation should detail the area of
operations, provide for federal incorporation, and immunize the agency from
state regulation and taxation.9 3 A statutory provision might be added to
encourage the utilization, where practicable, of the personnel of the experi-
enced old-line departments and bureaus without impairing the primary
responsibility of the Corporation for the regional program. Congress should
also create a Consultative State Advisory Committee to provide a continu-
ous policy liaison between the drainage basin states and the Corporation;
this technique appears preferable to placing state representatives on the
Corporation itself thus opening the door to possible rivalries for internal
control.9 4
91. The veto power has been used on only one occasion and has, by interpretation, been
severely restricted. See BARD, op. cit. uprra note 83, at 270-1; Cohen, op. cit. supra note 83,
at 14, n. 34.
Insufficient grants of power to the Authority impede its construction program and its
efforts to unify transportation facilities. See DImoCK AND BENSON., op. cil. supra note 69,
at 10; REGIONAL FACTORS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 41.
92. Several commentators have alluded to the possibility of a joint federal and state
public corporation for water resources development. See REGIONAL FAcToRs, op. cit. supra
note 2, at viii, 200; RA.NSMEIER, THE TENNESSEE VLLEY ATrronixy (1942) 438-9; Prit-
chett, Regional Autlwrities Through Interstate Compacts (1935) 14 Soc. ForcEs 200, 203-4.
See Report of THE DImECTrvE COMIITTEE ON REGIONAL PLANNING, op. Cit. supra note 2.
93. See the constructive recommendations of Field, Gorernment Corporations: A Pro-
posal (1935) 48 HARv. L.REv. 775.
94. For discussions of the role of lay agencies in regional planning, see HonG, THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AumoarnuT (1938) 162-83; RA.SHEIER, op. cit. supra note 92, at 44Q;
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The Congressional mandate would do well to exempt the valley authority
from the restrictive Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 which
may eliminate the very features which have made federal corporations useful
administrative devices.9 5 This legislation, suggested by Senator Byrd of
Virginia, subjects corporations to the supervision of the Budget Bureau (by
requiring the annual submission of a "business-type budget") and to the
General Accounting Office (by authorizing an audit by the Comptroller
General of all corporate accounts). The financial freedom of these agencies
has been further curtailed by granting the Secretary of the Treasury power
to approve the time, terms, and conditions under which bonds are to be sold
to the public, and to regulate the sale or purchase by the corporations of
United States government securities.
Attention should simultaneously be directed towards the preparation, as
a cooperative federal-state venture, of a comprehensive scheme for regional
development, the principal features of the plan to be incorporated into an
interstate compact to which the federal government and the states shall be
parties.96 The substantive provisions of this agreement should contain a
delegation by the states to the Federal Corporation of the principal state
powers affecting water resource control previously discussed.
To sustain the legality of the proposal against attacks based upon the
prohibition against delegations of power, the compact should embody a
mandatory instruction that the delegated authority is to be exercised by
the Corporation in strict conformity with the general plan of development
and the additional "primary standards" established by the signatory states.
As a minimum, the standards thus enumerated in the compact should detail
the legal system of water rights to prevail in the region, the relative priority
of major water uses, the rights to return and waste waters, a policy towards
appropriations for diversion to foreign watersheds, uniform formulas beyond
which pollution may not continue, and particular techniques to be employed
when physical relocation of families and towns is rendered essential. In addi-
NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE REP:, Regional Planning Part I (1936) 189. Eight bills
now before Congress provide for some form of lay committee to collaborate with the federal
valley authority. Clark, Proposed "Valley Authority" Legislation (1946) 40 Aus. POL. Scl.
REv. 62, 6,4-5.
95. Pub. L. No. 248, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 6, 1945). See discussion in Pritchett,
The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 (1946) 40 Am. POL. Sc:. REV. 495; Coffman,
Legal Status of Government Corporations (1946) 7 FED. B. J. 389, 390-5. A noteworthy feature
of the new Act is its requirement of federal incorporation of all government corporations,
Previously state incorporation of many important federal agencies produced jurisdictional
conflicts particularly in the fields of taxation and regulation. See McGuire, Some Problems
Arisingfrom Government Corporations (1937) 85 U. of PA. L. REv. 778, 787, n. 92; VAN DORN,
op. cit. supra-note 45, at 282; THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS (1937)
37-41. But see WEINTRAUB, op. cit. supra note 45, at 36.
96. The Drainage Basin survey of 1937 was the product of a similar joint federal-state
cooperative venture. See Warne, The Drainage Basin Studies: Cooperative Federalism fit
Practice (1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 565.
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tion, the compact should bind the Corporation to avoid interference, as far as
practicable, with existing water rights and to indemnify individuals in the
event that temporary interruptions of vested uses are unavoidable. This is
not a legal problem since the Supreme Court has indicated that water ap-
portionments by compact supersede all pre-existing individual rights; how-
ever, a provision of this nature should make the proposal more acceptable to
irrigation interests in the arid West.97
LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO TEE FUSION OF STATE AND FEDERAL
AUTHORITY
Although there is no precise precedent for a merger of federal and state
legislative powers, there have been at least five important examples of joint
governmental administrative cooperation.9 3 Shortly before the demise of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, an interstate compact for the sale
and distribution of convict-manufactured goods was executed, and the duty
of its enforcement and interpretation delegated to a mixed federal-state
commission 9 A second attempt to achieve unified administration was
exemplified by the Interstate Commission proposed to administer the New
England Minimum Wage Compact.10
A third type of cooperation is evidenced by the well-established govern-
mental practice of employing officials of another jurisdiction to enforce
domestic legislation. The states, for example, have deputized federal per-
sonnel as state fish and game wardens, designated Tennessee Valley Author-
ity guards as county police officers, and, more recently, vested national
Office of Price Administration employees with executive powers under the
New York State Rent Control Act.10'
97. Sections 10 and 11 of the proposed Missouri Valley Authority legislation expreEsly
validate existing vested rights of appropriation and give strict priority to the use of water
for domestic and irrigation purposes. The standards enumerated in the text supra at 296-7
go far beyond the safeguards for private rights written into the Murray Bill of which it has
been said:
"A careful study of the Missouri Valley Authority Act in comparison with
existing legislation indicates that so far as the legal status of water use in the semi-
arid section of the Missouri Basin is concerned, establishment of an Authority wil
have little effect." Erickson, supra note 57, at 12.
98. There have also been important examples of federal-state cooperation on the legis-
lative level. By statute, Congress has come to the aid of state law enforcement agencies
particularly where commerce in liquor, prison manufactured goods, or oil is concerned. The
Connolly Act, for example, makes it unlawful for any producer to ship in interstate com-
merce any oil which is produced in excess of quotas set under state law. See Comment (1942)
51 Y.E L. J. 608, 613. For a discussion of similar federal statutes in the field of liquor con-
trol, see Note (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 815.
99. See CLARK, THE RIsE OF A NEW FEDERALISu (1938) 80, 125; Clark, Irterstatl
Compacts and Social Legislation (1936) 51 POL. Sci. Q. 36, 50-1.
100. See THE NEw HAMPsEIRE Cotussiox ON INTERSTATE CopAcms AFFzcrumo
LABOR AND INDUSTRIES REP. (1935) 13; Clark, IRterstato Conpacts and Social L-gisation
(1936) 51 POL. SCi Q. 36, 50.
101. See CLARK, THE R SE OF A NEW FEDERALISt. (1938) 248-54; PM, July 3, 1946,
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Another striking example of inter-governmental administrative coopera-
tion is illustrated by the provisions of the New York Milk Control statute.
This Act authorizes the State Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets to
collaborate with representatives of the federal government in conducting
joint investigations and hearings. It also permits the Commissioner to issue
orders jointly with federal officials and to employ agents to carry out and
enforce any such concurrent federal-state orders.
1 2
Still a different mode of cooperative administration is exemplified by the
four Congressional statutes authorizing the creation of "joint boards" repre-
senting the states and vesting these boards with the full authority of the
federal commission with which they are to work. Under the Motor Carriers
Act,"3 for example, joint boards hear applications for the issuance or revo-
cation, of certificates, permits, or licenses, requests for the authorization of
consolidations and mergers, and complaints as to violations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission's regulations and rates. The joint boards can ad-
minister oaths, require testimony of witnesses, take depositions, and issue
directives which become the orders of the Commission if the latter does not
specifically review them. The exercise of this authority enables the states to
share directly in the policy formulations of federal agencies and in the inter-
pretation of federal statutes. Neither the joint boards nor the above men-
tioned forms of cooperative federalism have been successfully challenged in
the courts; nonetheless, a threat to the suggested fusion of federal and state
authority may be presented by additional projections of the prohibition
against the delegation of powers into the area of inter-governmental rela-
tions.
Delegations of State Powers to State Executive Agencies. The prohibition
against the delegation of powers is a conceptual formula, thought to be
implied from the very nature of a tri-partite system of government, and
evolved to limit transfers of authority among branches of the federal govern-
ment; but the Supreme Court and the state courts have applied the formula
p..4, col. 2. The federal government has consistently utilized state officials and bureaus to
enforce federal statutes with the approval of the courts. See Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197
U. S. 169, 174 (1905); Parker v. Richard, 250 U. S. 235, 239 (1919). Although the courts
have not expressly approved state utilization of federal officials, the practice, by analogy,
should be upheld. See Kauper, Validity of State Recovery Acts Adopting Federal Codes (1935)
35 MICE. L. REv. 597, 600, n. 10; Note (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. 601, 613; Garvey v. Trew,
170 P. (2d) 845 (Ariz. 1946). But see Note (1936) 14 NEB. L. BULL. 388,394.
102. See NEw YORK AGRICULTURE AND MARKEzs LAW § 258-n. The same procedure
has been utilized in the area around Fort Wayne, Indiana. See Cadwallader, Government
and Its Relationship To Price Standards in the Milk Industry (1938) 22 MINN. L. Rvv. 789,
828; Comment (1937) 46 YAE L. J. 1359, 1368.
103. See CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISu (1938) 99-101; Lindahl, Cooperation
Between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the State Commissions in Railroad Regula.
tion (1935) 33 Mica. L. REv. 338; Bosworth, Federal-State Administrative Relations In the
Regulation of Public Senice Enterprises (1942) 36 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 215, 234-5; Xauper,
Utilization of State Commissioners in the Administration of the Federal Motor Carrier Act
(1935) 34 Micar. L. REv. 37.
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without substantial modification to measure delegations by state govern-
mental agencies. 10 4 Modem decisions which do not completely ignore the
dogma are couched generally in terms of adequate compliance or non-
compliance with legislatively established "primary standards." The courts
profess to discover these administrative guides in the explicit wording of
particular statutes, in general statutory language coupled with a survey of
the surrounding circumstances, and, occasionally, in implications appar-
ently derived from the nature of the delegated power. 10 5
Assuming that a satisfactory standard can be discerned, state and federal
courts have been liberal in upholding the delegation in question2YS Although
the state decisions are rarely explicit on the point it has become clear from
the federal cases that there are many well defined escapes from the seem-
ingly rigid formula. Thus, transfers of legislative authority may be sustained
by the courts by a contention that in fact there was no real delegation, or
that the administrative agent merely had power to fill in the details of a
statute, or that the executive official was acting as an agent of the legisla-
ture, or that only "purely" or "strictly" legislative authority is non-dele-
gable, or even by frank admissions that some delegations are permissible.
7
Indeed the predictability with which a court will affix the label "ministerial
duty" rather than "legislative function" in order to sustain a statute may
depend more on the subject matter to be regulated than on the particular
form in which the delegated power is clothed.' 5
Delegation of State Powers to other States or to the Federal Gorernment.
With certain exceptions to be discussed subsequently, the same doctrinal
limitations on delegated authority have been applied in the area of inter-
governmental relations. A majority of the state court decisions involving
delegations to agencies of the federal government have sustained the statutes
in question on the ground that the state legislatures had defined appropriate
104. See Withrow, The Adoption By States of Present and Future Federal Legislation
(1935) 20 Coax. L. Q. 504, 506; Jefferson, The Supreme Court and State Separation atd
Delegation of Powers (1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 1, 10-11; Kauper, supra note 101, at 597-S.
105. See Harris, Constitutional Law: Delegation of Legislatire Power (1936) 24 C,=. L.
REv. 184, 190.
106. Delegations of power from state governments to local legislative bodies are rarely
challenged by the courts. See Aiken, The Nature and Exercise of Legislative Power (1938)
26 GEo. L. J. 606, 629; Withrow, loc. cit. supra note 104. And state delegations to private
groups including lot owners, universities, railroads, and clubs have been liberally sustained.
See Exp arte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412,77 Pac. 166 (1904); Note (1932) 32 COL. L. Rsv. 80.
107. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 521 (1911); United States v. Shreve-
port Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 85 (1932); Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 409, 411 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 693 (189"2); Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U. S. 364, 385 (1907); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U. S. 294, 305 (1933). See Harris, supra note 105, at 184; AW\ithrow, supra note
104, at 507, n. 14; Aiken, supra note 106, at 629.
108. See McGowen, An Economic Interpretation of the Doctrine of Delegation of Gorer,-
mzental.Powers (1938) 12 Tur. L. Rav. 179, 199.
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standards for administrative action." 9 Moreover, the courts have given their
approval to three important types of statutes which directly involve trans-
fers of legislative authority to a foreign jurisdiction. Thus state adoption
statutes which delegate the power to set the standards for domestic law en-
forcement agencies have been generally upheld. Reciprocal and retaliatory
legislation, common in the fields of liquor regulation and interstate taxation,
transfer to another state the authority to determine the operative date of
domestic statutes; yet these statutes are generally approved. And the courts
have validated state efforts to exempt from their anti-trust laws individuals
and associations complying with specified federal regulations.
n0
The execution of the national grant-in-aid program with its virtual subsi-
dization of state activities furnishes persuasive evidence that prohibitions
against inter-governmental delegations of power have not been strictly con-
strued."' In order to maintain what it considers proper supervisory control
over the allocated funds, the federal government has induced the states to
revamp their administrative machinery, prescribed detailed standards for
state personnel, penalized states for failing to carry out their obligations,
and demanded the submission of comprehensive plans, budgets, and progress
reports. It has also required state contributions of a specified amount as a
condition precedent to the disbursement of federal funds. National admin-
istrative standards have been enforced by temporary suspension of the flow
of funds, by disallowaflce of particular state expenditures deemed undesir-
able, and even by total absorption of the entire state grant-in-aid distribu-
tion. Despite allegations that supervisory controls of this nature repre-
sented invasions of state sovereignty, the Supreme Court has refused to
invalidate the grant-in-aid program where the monetary grant has been
made directly to the state goverzmpnts.11
2
109. "The incidental objection that the delegation [is] ... to the President of the United
States . . . does not greatly impress us. The correlative rights of state and nation are of
great importance, but we are a nation not an alliance of foreign states, and our President is
not a foreign potentate." Ex parte Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 183, 203, 36 P. (2d) 678, 687
(1934). See Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Glover, 159 P. (2d) 292 (Ariz. 1945); People
v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N. W. (2d) 193 (1945); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamber-
lain, 94 Conn. 47, 108 Atl. 154 (1919); Johnson v. Elliot, 168 S. W. 968 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914); James v. Walker, 141 Ky. 88, 132 S. W. 149 (1910); City of Pittsburgh v. Robb, 143
Kan. 1, 53 P. (2d) 203 (1936); Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. (2d) 291, 71 P. (2d) 209 (1937);
Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922).
110. Scottish Union and National Insurance Co. v. Phoenix Title and Trust Co., 28
Ariz. 22, 235 Pac. 137 (1925); Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922);
Hagood v. Doughton, 195 N. C. 811, 143 S. E. 841 (1928). See Withrow, supra note 104,
at 509; Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1077, 1084, 1085, n. 58, 1089, n. 90; Note (1934) 11
N. Y. U. L. Q. 601, 608-9; CLARx, THu RiSE OFA Nzw FEDERALISM (1938) 542-4.
111. For a general discussion of grants-in-aid, see CLARX, op. cit. supra note 110, at
192-253; Koenig, Federal and State Cooperation Under the Constitution (1938) 36 Micu. L.
REv. 752, 756-7; Strong, Cooperative Federalism (1938) 23 IowA L. Rvv. 459, 503; Hlorack,
Federal-State Cooperation for Social Security: The Grant-in-Aid (1935) 30 ILL. L. R v. 292,
293 et. seg.
112. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24 (1907); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S. 429 (1906);
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A second series of state court decisions, however, has voided attempted
statutory delegations to agencies of the federal government, thus giving rise
to speculation that any such delegation would be forbidden by state consti-
tutions."3 But a careful reading of the opinions reveals that the gravamen
of the judicial complaint in each instance was the total absence of state-
established primary standards to serve as a guide for the administrative
officials and not the incidental factor that the delegation in question was to
an official of the federal government. In analogous cases, the courts have
disapproved attempted adoption by reference of prospective federal legisla-
tion, but this form of adoption statute is equally invalid when it purports to
adopt prospective state legislation."
4
There remains a more damaging line of decisions which explicitly contend
that all delegations to the federal government are in derogation of state
"sovereignty" and therefore void. These cases ignore the judicially ap-
proved history of cooperative federalism exemplified by the state delegations
under the grant-in-aid program. Moreover, their verbal protestations about
"sovereignty" are readily met on the same level by the argument that sov-
ereign "rights" are not abandoned by a state which voluntarily relinquishes,
for a stated period, its "privilege" of exercising them."'
Three New York lower court opinions stress the sovereignty rationale,"5
but apparently they are not regarded as controlling authority even in New
York; thus, in Darweger v. Staats the Court of Appeals ignored the argument
raised below and invalidated the Schackno Act which purported to adopt by
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938). In United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1
(1936) the Court differentiated between federal grants to the states which it approved and
direct federal grants to individual farmers. The use of federal funds to implement the Social
Security Act was upheld in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937); Helvering
v. Davis 301 U. S. 619 (1937).
113. Holgate v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 200 At. 672 (1938); Smithberger v. Banning, 129
Neb. 651, 262 N. IV. 492 (1935); Darweger v. Staats, 267 N. Y. 290, 196 N. E. 61 (1935);
City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N. E. (2d) 919 (1945); Uhden v. Green-
ough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P. (2d) 983 (1935); Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495
(1940).
114. Thus, in Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 FIa. 707, 713, 197 So. 495, 498 (1940), the court
admitted that the statute might have been sustained had it merely adopted existing regula-
tions. A few courts have departed from the general rule and have allowed the adoption of
prospective legislation. Compare Commonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 At. 551
(1923).
115. When presented with apparent delegations of "sovereignty," some courts have
distinguished "sovereignty" and "jurisdiction" and held that only the latter was transferred.
Clarke v. Ackerman, 243 App. Div. 446, 278 N. Y. S. 75 (1st Dep't. 1935); Central R. R. v.
Jersey City, 70 N. J. L. 81, 56 Ad. 239 (Sup. Ct. 1903); City of New York v. Willcox, 115
Misc. 351, 189 N. Y. S. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Pritchett, supra note 92, at 20S.
116. See Cline v. Consumers' Co-operative Gas and Oil Co., 152 Misc. 653, 671, 274
N. Y. S. 362, 383 (Sup. Ct. 1934); De Agostina v. Parkshire Ridge Amusements, Inc., 155
Misc. 518, 524-5, 278 N. Y. S. 622, 629 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Darweger v. Staats, 153 Misc. 522,
529, 275 N. Y. S. 394, 403 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The remarks in the Cline case may be treated as
dicta inasmuch as the court had already dismissed plaintiff's complaint on other grounds.
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reference federal NRA codes, solely because adequate standards had not
been established by the state legislature.117 Three decisions from other juris-
dictions appear to support the New York lower court view,118 but subse-
quent judges might readily distinguish these precedents on the grounds that
there was in each case a failure to prescribe standards or an attempt to adopt
prospective legislation. Inasmuch as other courts have found little difficulty
in sustaining statutes similar to the one held unconstitutional in New York,
it may be inferred that they will regard subsequent delegations with a
greater liberality than do the New York cases."'
Apart from the problem of delegated authority, there exist few serious
legal impediments to the proposal previously outlined. Enabling legislation,
as indicated previously, will be required.' Difficulties may be presented by
restrictions in a few states forbidding local participation in programs of
"internal improvements" and placing severe Jimitations upon the purposes
for which state funds may be expended or bonds issued.' 2' Any effort to
provide for financial contributions to the corporate program may encounter
state constitutional debt limitations 122 or, conceivably, provisions barring the
pledge or loan of state revenues to private corporations. 121 However, it is
likely that the benefits accruing to these states from regional water develop-
ment coupled with a judicious use of federal grants will evoke considerable
liberalization of these restrictions. The conclusion that state constitutions
do not bar the plan is fortified by the results of a recent informal question-
naire; of replies received from thirty-two Attorney Generals, only three
117. New York Laws 1933, c. 781; 267 N. Y. 290, 196 N. E. 61 (1935). The Court de-
clared; "The Legislature has left too many things to be determined by other bodies to make
this law constitutional." !d. at 304, 196 N.E. at 65.
118. Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. City of Centralia, 11 F. Supp.874 (E. D. Ill.
1935); In Re Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 611, 133 N. E. 453,455 (1921); Smith-
berger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 662, 262 N. W. 492, 498 (1935).
119. See Kauper, Validity of State Recovery Acts Adopting Federal Codes (1935) 33 MicU.
L. REv. 597, 598-9. Compare the New York cases with City of Pittsburgh v. Robb, 143
Kan. 1, 53 P. (2d) 203 (1936). And compare Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S. W. (2d)
651 (1937), with Illinois Power and Light Corp. v. City of Centralia, 11 F. Supp. 874 (E. D.
Ill. 1935).
120. See note 53 supra.
121. See DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, STATE LEGISLATION FOR B.rrE LAND UsE (1941)
xiv-xv; Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Attorney General of Florida,
July 30,1946.
122. At one time Pennsylvania was unable to accept a large federal grant prompting
Governor Earle to comment bitterly: "I consider 881,883,806 a great deal of money to lose
because of an antiquated constitution." Graves, State Constitutional Provisions For Federal-
State Cooperation (1935) 181 ANNALS 142, 143.
123. See Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Attorney General of Florida,
July 30, 1946. State laws preventing the grant of special privileges or immunities to any
corporation may conceivably be applied to a government corporation. But see State ex ret.
Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P. (2d) 637 (1935).
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indicated definitely that proposals for the fusion of federal and state func-
tions would, in their opinion, be forbidden by state law.
2 4
CONCLUSION
The scarcity of water in the arid and semi-arid regions of the United
States, coupled with the interstate character of drainage basin problems,
has produced demands for effective federal-state water control and regional
development. Since continuous administrative supervision is a necessity,
the Supreme Court appears inherently incapable of resolving the frequent
interstate conflicts. The National Departments and the Regional Valley
Authority have been hindered to date by jurisdictional disputes and by an
inability to utilize powers currently vested in the states. The scope of pro-
grams which can be administered by the states acting through commissions
and compacts is limited because major responsibility and authority for water
planning and development rests with the federal government The fusion of
national and local powers into a single agency would overcome the principal
administrative obstacle to a unified governmental water program, and may
be successfully reconciled with current judicial opinion. 12-
124. The questionnaire submitted to the states wras in a general form and did not con-
tain the details set forth in the text. The replies received were all informal and are not, of
course, binding upon the Attorney Generals. All agreed that there was no specific precedent
for the proposal, and Indiana, Tennessee and Nevada indicated that any cooperative pro-
gram of this nature would be unconstitutional. However, the responses from Kentucky,
Utah, West Virginia, Georgia, Washington, and Califqrnia suggest that the legal barriers
are not insuperable.
125. Reconciliation of the plan with current political opinion may present a more
formidable obstacle. The bitter opposition of the Montana Copper and Power Company
to the proposed MVA indicates that private power interests remain unimpressed with the
prospect that valley authority legislation will open up new markets for cheap electricity.
Prior to the formation of the Federal Power Commission, the late Gifford Pinchot remarked,
"the electric power interests were all for Federal control-because there vasn't any. Now
these same interests are all for state control-because for nearly all practical purposes there
isn't any." Quoted in Scott, Is Federal Control of aVter Power Incompoille will; State In-
terests? (1941) 9 GEO. WAsH. L. Rnv. 631, 634. A second line of opposition may come from
private associations like the National Reclamation Association which, although approving
many of the objectives of valley authority legislation, are closely identified with the methods
and administration of the old-line federal bureaus. See Howard, Golden Rirer (May 1945)
190 HARPPFas 511, 517. Finally a considerable body of opimion may oppose any extension of
federal activity on the grounds that it leads to overcentralization and to the destruction of
"states rights"; this attitude is well exemplified by the position of the Council of State Gov-
ernments. For an illustration of this reasoning, see Communication to YALE LAw JouniuL
from the Attorney General of Nevada, June 28, 1946.
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